Based in Edinburgh, Scotland, Patrick is a faculty member, as a Chancellor's Fellow, at the University of Edinburgh.  He completed his PhD in philosophy (December 2011) at the University of California, Riverside.  He is interested in metaphysics, ethics, free will and moral responsibility, and philosophy of religion.

Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the "Order of Explanation": An Intervention

Ethics (forthcoming)


P.F. Strawson’s (1962) “Freedom and Resentment” has provoked a wide ride range of responses, both positive and negative, and an equally wide range of interpretations. In particular, beginning with Gary Watson, some have seen Strawson as suggesting a point about the “order of explanation” concerning moral responsibility: it is not that it is appropriate to hold agents responsible because they are morally responsible, rather, it is ... well, something else. Such claims are often developed in different ways, but one thing remains constant: they meant to be incompatible with libertarian theories of moral responsibility. The overarching theme of this paper is that extant developments of “the reversal” face a dilemma: in order to make the proposals plausibly anti-libertarian, they must be made to be implausible on other grounds. I canvas different attempts to articulate a “Strawsonian reversal”, and argue that none is fit for the purposes for which it is intended. I conclude by suggesting a way of clarifying the intended thesis: an analogy with the concept of funniness. The result: proponents of the “reversal” need to accept the difficult result that if we blamed small children, they would be blameworthy, or instead explain how their view escapes this result, while still being a view on which our blaming practices “fix the facts” of moral responsibility.

Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise

Future Contingents Are All False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open Future.